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Absurdist	 plays	 sometimes	 feature	 extraordinary	 or	 fantastical	
events	that	aren’t	given	any	explanation,	and	serve	to	create	a	sense	





the	opening	scene	of	Rosencrantz and Guildenstern	 is	 that,	although	it	
does	 succeed	 in	creating	a	 feeling	of	unreality,	once	you	drill	down	
into	the	details,	nothing extraordinary actually happens.	As	Guildenstern	
himself	points	out,	all	that	we	have	here	is	a	sequence	of	92	perfectly	
ordinary	events,	none	of	which	needs	any	explanation.
My	 aim	 here	 is	 to	 defend	 Guildenstern	—	or	 his	 last	 hypothesis,	
anyway.	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 really	 is	 nothing surprising	 about	
throwing	92	heads	in	a	row	and	that	Guildenstern	more	or	less	explains	
why	—	though	 we	 may	 want	 to	 expand	 upon	 his	 reasoning	 a	 bit.	 I	
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Coins	 can’t	 predict	 the	 future	 and	 are	 not	 aware	 of	 the	 past.	 If	 it’s	
unsurprising	for	the	first	coin	to	land	heads,	and	it’s	unsurprising	for	
the	second	coin	to	land	heads,	and	these	are	independent	events,	then	











is	 actually	 very	 like	 one	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 Shackle’s	 system	—	his	


























should	say	right	away	 that	 I	don’t	 think	Guildenstern	has	especially	
high	 standards	 for	 what	 should	 count	 as	 surprising,	 and	 neither	 do	
I.	It’s	surprising	if	I	flick	the	light	switch	and	the	room	remains	dark.	









if	 we	 were	 actually	 confronted	 with	 such	 a	 thing.	 My	 claim	 is	 that	








But	 let’s	 stay	 with	 coins	 for	 the	 time	 being.	 Guildenstern	 seems	
















at	 8:31am.	 Clearly,	 though,	 these	 two	 events	 are	 connected	—	when	 I	
arrive	at	work	will	depend,	in	part,	on	when	I	leave	for	work,	and	that’s	
why	 it	 would	 be	 surprising	 for	 both	 of	 these	 events	 to	 occur,	 even	
though	neither	event	would	be	surprising	on	its	own.	
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Y ou	may	want	to	complain	at	this	point	that	I’m	missing	some-thing	 obvious	—	namely,	 that	 it’s	 very	 unlikely	 for	 someone	to	 throw	92	heads	 in	a	 row.	And	 if	 something	very	unlikely	
happens,	then	that’s	got	to	be	surprising,	doesn’t	it?	Surely	any	”proof”	
that	 seems	 to	 show	 otherwise	 is	 just	 some	 sort	 of	 trick	 and	 no	 real	











ing	to	choose	exactly the same one.	Surely	if	a	1-in-5,000-trillion-trillion	
event	 were	 to	 actually	 happen,	 then	 this	 would	 be	 near	 miraculous	
and	certainly	very	surprising.	If	you	have	this	reaction,	then	you’re	in	
good	company.
In	 the	 1760s	 the	 polymath	 Jean	 le	 Rond	 d’Alembert	 questioned	
whether	it	was	even	possible	to	observe	a	long	run	of	a	single	outcome	




happen.	 But	 this	 kind	 of	 idea	 is	 perhaps	 put	 most	 starkly	 by	 Émile	
Borel	—	another	 major	 figure	 from	 the	 history	 of	 probability	 theory.	
In	his	Les probabilités et la vie (Probabilities and Life),	first	published	in	
1942,	Borel	stated,	“Events	with	a	sufficiently	small	probability	never	
occur.”	 Borel	 referred	 to	 this	 as	 a	 “law	 of	 chance”	—	indeed	 he	 once	
said	it	was	the	only	law	of	chance.	It’s	now	sometimes	known	simply	
as	”Borel’s	law”.	A	natural	first	reaction	to	Borel’s	law	is	to	think	that	




























.	 This	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 what	 Spohn	 calls	 the	





















Put	 less	 formally,	 the	 idea	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 at	 work	 in	 both	 of	










	 and	 the	 connection	 between	 them.	 As	 such,	 if	
e
1
	 is	 completely	 unsurprising	 and	 e
2
	 is	 completely	 unsurprising	 and	












oxygen,	water,	carbon	dioxide	molecules	etc.	 that	 it	did.	 In	fact,	 this	
could	be	even more	unlikely	than	throwing	92	heads	in	a	row.	
It’s	not	only	when	we	repeatedly	flip	coins	that	something	unlikely	
is	 bound	 to	 happen	—	something	 unlikely	 is	 bound	 to	 happen	 with	
every	 intake	 of	 breath,	 every	 heartbeat,	 every	 step.	 If	 I’m	 surprised	
by	 throwing	92	consecutive	heads,	based	 just	on	 its	 low	probability,	
then	 I	 should	 be	 in	 a	 state	 of	 constant	 amazement.	 This	 is	 why	 I	
say	that	Borel’s	law	is	the	opposite	of	the	truth.	According	to	Borel’s	
law,	 unlikely	 things	 never	 happen	—	and	 yet,	 in	 a	 sense,	 everything 




























I’ve	 come	 to	 think,	 though,	 that	 Borel’s	 law	 is	 not	 even	 close	 to	
being	 right	—	in	 fact	 it’s	 almost	 the	 exact	 opposite	 of	 the	 truth.	 One	
very	 important	 difference	 between	 the	 mathematics	 of	 probability	
and	 the	 mathematics	 of	 surprise	 (on	 both	 Shackle’s	 treatment	 and	
the	ranking	theoretic	treatment)	is	that	we	can	have	a	setup	in	which	
every	 possible	 outcome	 is	 highly	 improbable,	 but	 we	 cannot	 have	
a	 situation	 in	 which	 every	 possible	 outcome	 is	 highly	 surprising.	
Improbability	 and	 surprisingness	 cannot	 be	 the	 same	 thing.	 Come	
back	 to	 the	 case	 of	 the	 92	 coin	 throws.	 If	 we	 are	 going	 to	 throw	 92	
coins	in	a	row,	then	we	know	in	advance	that	there	is	going	to	be	some 




fact,	 each	 of	 these	 sequences	 has	 a	 probability	 of	 0.592.	 If	 we	 throw	
92	coins	 in	a	 row,	 then	a	 1-in-5,000-trillion-trillion	event	 is bound to 
happen	—	and,	as	such,	we	shouldn’t	be	surprised	when	a	1-in-5,000-
trillion-trillion	event	does happen.	
If	 I’m	surprised	by	92	heads	 in	a	row,	on	 the	grounds	 that	 it’s	so	
unlikely,	 then	 I’d	 have	 to	 be	 surprised	 by	 any	 sequence	 that	 came	
up	—	surprised	 no matter how the 92 coins land.	 This	 already	 seems	
like	a	bad	enough	result,	but	 it	goes	much	further	than	coin	throws.	
Perhaps	you	just	took	a	breath.	Nothing	unlikely	about	that,	you	might	
think	—	or	 is	 there?	 If	 you	 just	 took	a	breath,	 then	 it	must	have	had	
some	 precise	 duration;	 there	 must	 have	 been	 some	 precise	 volume	
that	 was	 inhaled	 and	 exhaled;	 indeed,	 there	 must	 have	 been	 some	
precise	number	of	oxygen	molecules,	water	molecules,	carbon	dioxide	
molecules	etc.	 that	entered	and	 left	your	 lungs	and	so	on.	We	don’t	
know	 what	 these	 numbers	 are,	 of	 course,	 but	 we	 know	 this:	 It	 is	







So	 yes,	 there	 is	 one	 sense	 in	 which	 we	 should	 “expect”	 to	 get	
around	 46	 heads	—	we	 should	 regard	 this	 as	 highly	 likely,	 or	 assign	
it	a	high	probability.	The	set	of	sequences	in	which	we	have	around	
46	heads	covers	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	 total	 set	of	outcomes.	But	
there’s	another	sense	in	which	we	shouldn’t	“expect”	to	get	around	46	
heads	—	we	shouldn’t	believe that this is going to happen.	We	shouldn’t	
believe	 that	 the	 sequences	 outside	 the	 set	 won’t	 come	 up,	 while	
keeping	an	open	mind	about	the	sequences	inside	the	set.	There	are	
no	grounds	for	this	—	the	sequences	are	all	on	a	par.







ing	 to	happen	and	 it	does,	 then	that’s	surprising	 for	us.	Surprise	 is	a	
guide	to	belief.
Furthermore,	 if	 we	 have	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 something	 isn’t	
going	to	happen,	then	we	have	reason	to	be	surprised	if	it	does	happen.	
Or,	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 if	 we	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 be	 surprised	 if	 a	
certain	event	happens,	then	we	have	no	reason	to	believe	that	it	won’t	
happen	—	we	 should	 keep	 an	 open	 mind	 about	 it.	 Rational surprise 
is	a	guide	 to	 rational belief.	 If	 it’s	 right	 that	we	have	no	 reason	 to	be	
and	 tails	—	but	 talk	 about	 “expectations”	 is	 somewhat	 ambiguous.	
Probability	theorists	define	the	“expected	value”	of	a	random	variable	
to	be	the	probability-weighted	average	of	the	possible	values	that	the	





curve”	 with	 its	 peak	 at	 46.	 We	 can	 calculate	 that	 the	 probability	 of	


















between	 40	 and	 50	 heads	 in	 some	 combination.	 This	 is	 a	 large	 set,	
but	there’s	nothing	special	about	the	sequences	that	make	it	up	—	no	




like,	and	 it	will	be	approx.	73.8%	probable	 that	 the	actual	 sequence	

















‘1234567’	 in	 the	 lottery.	People	will	often	 try	 to	 find	some	deliberate,	






What,	 in	 any	 case,	 is	 the	 point	 of	 surprise?	 What	 would	 we	 be	
missing	 in	 our	 lives	 if	 we	 never	 felt	 surprised	 by	 anything	—	if	 we	
greeted	 everything	 with	 a	 shrug?	 I	 think	 we	 would	 be	 missing	
something	crucial	—	for	part	of	 the	purpose	of	 surprise	 is	 to	spur	us	
into	action.	If	an	event	surprises	us,	then	that	prompts	us	to	investigate	
why	and	how	it	happened	—	to	try	and	explain	it.	There	is	something	




happen	 that	 this	 is	 the	 sequence	 that	 came	 up,	 and	 there’s	 nothing	
surprised	by	throwing	92	heads	in	a	row,	it	follows	that	we	shouldn’t	
believe	in	advance	that	this	won’t	happen.	
Questions	 about	 when	 we	 are	 justified	 or	 rational	 in	 believing	
things	 have	 been	 discussed	 a	 great	 deal	 by	 philosophers,	 scientists,	
legal	theorists	and	many	others.	Many	of	those	who	have	considered	
such	questions	have	converged	on	the	view	that	probabilities	 should	
be	 our	 guide	 when	 forming	 beliefs	—	that	 we	 should	 believe	 those	
things	that	are	likely	to	be	true,	disbelieve	those	things	that	are	likely	
to	be	false,	and	otherwise	suspend	judgment.	Call	this	the	probability 






very	 likely	 that	 they	 won’t	 land	 TTHTHTHH…	 and	 so	 on.	 While	 it	
might	 be	 perfectly	 rational	 for	 me	 to	 bet	 on	 these	 things,	 it’s	 not	
rational	 for	 me	 to	 believe	 them.	 If	 the	 coins	 did	 land	 THTTHHTH…	
or	land	TTHTHTHH…,	then	it	would	not	be	rational	to	be	surprised.	








car	 is	no	 longer	where	 I	parked	 it,	 then	 that’s	surprising.	While	 this	
may	well	be	an	unlikely	event,	what	seems	more	significant	is	that	it’s	
an	 event	 that	 demands	 explanation	 of	 some	 kind.	 Perhaps	 someone	
broke	into	the	car	and	stole	it.	Perhaps	I	parked	illegally	and	the	car	
was	 then	towed.	Perhaps	 I	didn’t	properly	apply	 the	handbrake	and	
the	car	rolled	away….	Whatever	the	truth,	it	can’t	“just	so	happen”	that	
the	car	is	now	gone	and	there’s	nothing	more	to	the	story.	This	isn’t	










events	 that	 are	 left	 unexplained.	 Another	 very	 common	 trope	 in	
absurdist	drama	 is	 for	characters	 to	 reason	 in	nonsensical	ways	and	
to	jump	to	bizarre	conclusions.	Guildenstern’s	first	three	hypotheses	
about	 the	 coin-throwing	 episode	 are	 indeed	 bizarre.	 And	 so	 too,	 I	











Advances in Applied Mathematics	 v12(4)	 [A	 survey	 of	 some	 early	
research	on	human	judgments	of	what	is	random	and	what	isn’t.]
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But,	 once	 these	 realistic	 possibilities	 have	 been	 ruled	 out,	 and	 we	
know	they	don’t	obtain,	any	remaining	urge	to	find	some explanation 
(no	matter	how	 farfetched)	becomes	 self-defeating.	As	difficult	as	 it	




back	 to	 Guildenstern’s	 reasoning,	 this	 seems	 to	 predict	 that	 the	




it’s	 unsurprising	 for	 event	 e
2
	 to	 happen,	 and	 these	 two	 events	 are	


















still	be	there	an	hour	later.	 If	 it	 isn’t,	 then	it	would	be	rational	to	be	






are	 many	 things	 that	 we	 can	 rationally	 believe	—	but	 the	 claim	 that	
we	won’t	throw	92	heads	in	a	row	is	not	one	of	them.	I	can	rationally	
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